VII 

Pretended "Authority" of the Pretended "Constitution"

It is plain, then, that on general principles of law and reason - such principles as we all act upon in courts of justice and in common life - the pretended "constitution" is no contract; that it binds nobody, and never did bind anybody; and that all those who pretend to act by its "authority," are really acting without any legitimate authority at all; that on general principles of law and reason, they are mere usurpers, and that everybody not only has the right, but is morally bound to treat them as such.

If some people wish to establish and maintain such a "government," as the pretended "constitution" describes, there is no reason in the world why they should not sign the instrument itself, and thus make known their wishes in an open, authentic manner; in such manner as the common sense and experience of mankind have shown to be reasonable and necessary in such cases; and in such manner as to make themselves (as they ought to do) individually responsible for the acts of their pretended "government." But no one has ever been asked to sign it. And the only reason why they have never been asked to sign it, is that it is known that they never would sign it; that they were neither such fools nor knaves as they must needs be to be willing to sign it; that (at least as it has been practically interpreted) it is not what any sensible and honest man wants for himself; nor such as he has any right to impose upon others. It is, to all moral intents and purposes, as destitute of obligation as the compacts which thieves, robbers, and pirates enter into with each other, but never sign.

If any considerable number of people believe the pretended "constitution" to be good, why do they not sign it themselves, and make laws for, and administer them upon, each other, leaving all other persons (who do not interfere with them) in peace? Until they have tried the experiment for themselves, how can they have the gall to impose their pretended "constitution" upon, or even to recommend it to, others? Plainly the reason for such absurd and inconsistent conduct is that they want the pretended "constitution," not solely for any honest or legitimate use it can be to themselves or others, but for the dishonest and illegitimate power it gives them over the persons and properties of others. It is for this latter reason, that they eulogize the pretended "constitution," that they exhort the gullible to revere it, that they expend so much money and blood to sustain it.

VIII

The pretended "constitution" itself, then, being of no authority, on what authority does the pretended "government" practically rest? On what ground can those who pretend to "administer" it, claim the right to seize men's property, to restrain them of their natural liberty of action, industry, and trade, and to punish, or even kill, all who deny their supposed "authority" to dispose of men's properties, liberties, and lives at their pleasure or discretion?

The most they can say, in answer to this question, is, that some half, two-thirds, or three-fourths, of the male adults of the country have a tacit understanding that they will maintain a pretended "government" under the pretended "constitution"; that they will select, by ballot, the persons to administer it; and that those persons who may receive a majority, or a plurality, of their ballots, shall act as their representatives, and administer the pretended "constitution" in their name, and by their authority.

But this tacit understanding (admitting it to exist) cannot at all justify the conclusion drawn from it. A tacit understanding between A, B, and C, that they will, by ballot, depute D as their agent, to deprive me of my property, liberty, or life, cannot at all authorize D to do so. He is none the less a tyrant, robber, and murderer, because he claims to act as their agent, than he would be if he avowedly acted on his own responsibility alone.

Neither am I bound to recognize him as their agent, nor can he legitimately claim to be their agent, when he brings no written authority from them accrediting him as such. I am under no obligation to take his word as to who his principals may be, or whether he has any. Bringing no credentials, I have a right to say he has no such authority even as he claims to have, and that he is therefore intending to rob, enslave, or murder me on his own account.

This tacit understanding, therefore, among the voters of the country, amounts to nothing as an authority to their agents. Neither do the ballots by which they select their agents, avail any more than does their tacit understanding; for their ballots are given in secret, and therefore in a way to avoid any personal responsibility for the acts of their agents.

No body of men can be said to authorize a man to act as their agent, to the injury of a third person, unless they do it in so open and authentic a manner as to make themselves personally responsible for his acts. None of the voters in this country appoint their political agents in any open, authentic manner, or in any manner to make themselves responsible for their acts. Therefore these pretended agents cannot legitimately claim to be really agents. Somebody must be responsible for the acts of these pretended agents; and if they cannot show any open and authentic credentials from their principals, they cannot, in law or reason, be said to have any principals. The maxim applies here, that what does not appear, does not exist. If they can show no principal, they have none.

But even these pretended agents do not themselves know who their pretended principals are. These latter act in secret; for acting by secret ballot is acting in secret as much as if they were to meet in secret conclave in the darkness of the night. And they are personally as much unknown to the agents they select, as they are to others. No pretended agent therefore can ever know by whose ballots he is selected, or consequently who his real principals are. Not knowing who his principals are, he has no right to say that he has any. He can, at most, say only that he is the agent of a secret gang of tyrants, robbers, and murderers, who are bound by that faith which prevails among confederates in crime, to stand by him, if his acts, done in their name, shall be resisted.

Men honestly engaged in attempting to establish justice in the world, have no occasion thus to act in secret; or to appoint agents to do acts for which they (the principals) are not willing to be personally responsible.

The secret ballot makes a secret tyranny, a secret gang of tyrants, robbers, and murderers. Open despotism is better than this. The single despot stands out in the face of all men, and says: "I am the state; my will is law; I am your master; I take the responsibility of my acts; the only arbiter I acknowledge is the sword; if any one denies my right, let him try conclusions with me."

But a secret tyranny is little less than a tyranny of assassins. Under it, a man knows not who his tyrants are, until they have struck, and perhaps not then. He may guess, beforehand, as to some of his immediate neighbors. But he really knows nothing with certainty. The man to whom he would most naturally fly for protection, may prove an enemy, when the time of trial comes.

This is the kind of tyranny we have; and it is the only one we are likely to have, until men are ready to say: "We will consent to no constitution, except such an one as we are neither ashamed nor afraid to sign; and we will authorize no agents or representatives to do anything in our name which we are not willing to be personally responsible for."

Next - The Secret Ballot and the Hoax of Government